Pricing and monetization · Estimated two-stage supply-side model of platform–merchant bargaining using Nash-bargaining solutions and counterfactuals.
Price Bargaining and Competition in Online Platforms: An Empirical Analysis of the Daily Deal Market
Lingling Zhang, Doug J. Chung (2020). Price Bargaining and Competition in Online Platforms: An Empirical Analysis of the Daily Deal Market. Marketing Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2019.1213.
Plain-English take
Larger platforms deliver larger customer bases but lower merchant margins; absent platform competition, merchants are worse off while consumers face lower prices and higher total demand. For your marketing: Use this study to frame a pricing or packaging hypothesis and define outcomes to measure; estimate effects with your own customer mix and willingness-to-pay evidence.
How much weight to give this
2.5/5 Evidence needs cautious interpretation
The 1–5 evidence-check score is a practical reading aid, not a formal peer review or a probability that a conclusion is true. It combines design strength (2 points), sample reporting (1), comparison/control clarity (1), and how much of the paper could be checked (1). Access affects how confidently this directory can assess a study, not the study's underlying quality. Blinding is reported separately because it is not relevant to every design.
Estimated two-stage supply-side model of platform–merchant bargaining using Nash-bargaining solutions and counterfactuals.
Comprehensive U.S. daily-deal market data; merchants, platforms, deals, wholesale prices and demand.
Judged from the publisher-described design and comparison; consult the paper for complete analysis.
Publisher page and abstract were retrieved directly; full text was not assumed open.
Double-blind? Blinding was not established from the retrieved publisher record.
Research question
What the authors investigated
How do platform competition and bargaining power affect merchant reach, margins, consumer prices and demand?
Design
Estimated two-stage supply-side model of platform–merchant bargaining using Nash-bargaining solutions and counterfactuals.
Sample and setting
Comprehensive U.S. daily-deal market data; merchants, platforms, deals, wholesale prices and demand.
Reported result
What the study found
Larger platforms deliver larger customer bases but lower merchant margins; absent platform competition, merchants are worse off while consumers face lower prices and higher total demand.
This is a paraphrase of the source. Check the original paper for definitions, estimates, statistical uncertainty and analysis details.
Scope and transfer
Limitations to keep in view
The empirical setting is U.S. daily deals and conclusions rely on the specified bargaining model and counterfactual assumptions; the abstract does not claim universal platform effects.
Possible founder application
Use this study to frame a pricing or packaging hypothesis and define outcomes to measure; estimate effects with your own customer mix and willingness-to-pay evidence.
Evidence access
Publisher record and abstract retrieved; consult the linked paper for full methods and tables.
Publisher abstract states the data context, two-stage model, bargaining framework and reported counterfactual findings. Direct publisher-page retrieval was recorded on 2026-10-09; this profile uses publisher metadata/abstract and does not claim independent review of unavailable full text.
If only an abstract or metadata was available, the profile is limited to claims supported there. A paper's paywall does not change its evidentiary status, but it limits what we can substantiate from accessible text.