Platforms · Estimated two-stage supply-side model of platform–merchant bargaining using Nash-bargaining solutions and counterfactuals.
Price Bargaining and Competition in Online Platforms: An Empirical Analysis of the Daily Deal Market
Marketing Science · 2020
Summary
Larger platforms deliver larger customer bases but lower merchant margins; absent platform competition, merchants are worse off while consumers face lower prices and higher total demand.
For your marketing
Possible founder application
Use this study to frame a pricing or packaging hypothesis and define outcomes to measure; estimate effects with your own customer mix and willingness-to-pay evidence.
Reported result
What the study found
Larger platforms deliver larger customer bases but lower merchant margins; absent platform competition, merchants are worse off while consumers face lower prices and higher total demand.
Research question
What the authors investigated
How do platform competition and bargaining power affect merchant reach, margins, consumer prices and demand?
Design
Estimated two-stage supply-side model of platform–merchant bargaining using Nash-bargaining solutions and counterfactuals.
Sample and setting
Comprehensive U.S. daily-deal market data; merchants, platforms, deals, wholesale prices and demand.
Scope and transfer
Limitations to keep in view
The empirical setting is U.S. daily deals and conclusions rely on the specified bargaining model and counterfactual assumptions; the abstract does not claim universal platform effects.
Research sources
Publisher abstract states the data context, two-stage model, bargaining framework and reported counterfactual findings. Direct publisher-page retrieval was recorded on 2026-10-09; this profile uses publisher metadata/abstract and does not claim independent review of unavailable full text.